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In March 2011, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia started a dialogue that was intended 
to lead to the normalisation of mutual relations. This process, launched under the pressure of 
the EU, was aimed at building up confidence between the parties and resolving the everyday 
problems of the Serbian and Albanian communities, and as a consequence, reducing tension 
in the Western Balkans. The start of talks between representatives of the antagonist countries 
was the breakthrough that led to the Kosovo government gaining control over the whole 
of its territory, the establishment of a border (or ‘administrative boundary line’, as Belgrade 
calls it), and the start of the process of subordinating the Kosovo Serbian institutions to the 
authorities in Prishtina. Serbia also lifted its trade blockade on Kosovo, and allowed Prishtina 
to join the regional organisations. As a result, progress has been made in the process of inte-
gration of  both states with the EU: Serbia has started accession negotiations, and Kosovo has 
signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).
Since 2013, however, no significant progress has been made in the  normalisation process or in 
implementing the agreements. Politicians in Kosovo and Serbia see the dialogue through the 
prism of the benefits they can get from Brussels and the EU member states in exchange for 
compromises. Their aim is not so much normalisation and reconciliation in Serbian-Kosovar 
relations, but rather making progress with EU integration and obtaining support from the 
West for the ruling elites, while turning a blind eye to undemocratic practices. The talks being 
held at the level of the elites have not translated into rapprochement between the Serbian 
and Albanian communities. On the contrary, these non-transparent negotiations have actually 
resulted in a rise in tension and suspicion. The talks, which since 2013 have been dominat-
ed by a dispute over the status of the Association of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo, have 
paradoxically led to its strong subordination to the government in Belgrade, and not to their 
integration into the state of Kosovo. At the same time, the talks have failed to bring any im-
provements to the conditions under which the Serbian minority operates; and in the Kosovo 
Albanians’ opinion, they have not brought Kosovo the benefits they expected, as the provi-
sions which have been agreed have still not been implemented. 
Serbia managed to block Kosovo’s membership in UNESCO in the autumn of 2015, which 
further undermined relations between Belgrade and Prishtina. The slowdown in the normal-
isation process is also apparent in the reduced activity by the EU, which has limited tools to 
put pressure on the parties. Consequently, the chances for a comprehensive arrangement of 
relations between Kosovo and Serbia are decreasing. The negative trends are deepening, and 
public opposition to the negotiations is increasing (especially in Kosovo), which may mean 
that the achievements concluded in the process so far couldbe lost.
Hostages to dialogue  
The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations
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After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence in February 2008, the government 
of Serbia took a series of actions calling its 
sovereignty into question and hindering its 
functioning1. This diplomatic offensive was 
intended to limit the number of countries rec-
ognising Kosovo’s independence and block its 
membership in international organisations. 
By supporting the Serbian minority in Kosovo 
(numbering around 130,000 people), whose in-
stitutions were financed by Belgrade, the Ser-
bian government intended to prevent Prishti-
na from taking control of its entire2 territory. 
Serbia also asked the International Court of 
Justice to rule on whether Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence conformed to international 
law. The court’s decision in 2010 (which went 
against Serbia) led to the start of the Serbi-
an-Kosovar dialogue, as did the application of 
pressure from the EU, which took advantage 
of the accession aspirations of both Belgrade 
and Prishtina. This was a breakthrough because 
1 Serbia refused contacts with the authorities in Kosovo and 
demanded that Prishtina be represented by the UN mission 
UNMIK; Serbia also blocked the flow of goods and people 
with Kosovo documentation, as well as air services to Koso-
vo over Serbian territory; it also refused to acknowledge 
any documents issued by the Kosovo authorities.
2 The Serbian minority in Kosovo inhabits an enclave in the 
south of Kosovo (six municipalities with a Serb majority, 
totalling around 53,000 people, as well as some villages in 
Albanian municipalities, totalling about 28,000). The largest 
compact area inhabited by Serbs is made up of four munic-
ipalities in the north of Kosovo bordering Serbia (63,000 
people) including the only Serbian town, Mitrovica, where 
the university and medical centre are located, among oth-
er facilities. This area  remains outside the control of both 
Prishtina and Belgrade; the latter only provides funding for 
the activities of the municipalities. M. Perlec, n. Rashiti, Serbs 
Integration in Kosovo after the Brussels Agreement, http://
balkansgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/URSerb-In-
tegration-Kosovo-19-March-2015.pdf, p. 5.
Belgrade had previously ruled out negotiating 
with the authorities in Kosovo, which it consid-
ered still belonged to Serbia. In turn, the ruling 
class in Kosovo adopted the position that Ser-
bia had to accept the independence of Koso-
vo, and that the points of contention and the 
status of the Serbian minority were the internal 
problems of the state of Kosovo, and including 
them in the negotiations would be tantamount 
to contesting its sovereignty. 
The outcome of the negotiations
The process of normalisation began with the 
technical negotiations (March 2011-February 
2012) between special representatives of both 
parties, with the participation of an EU medi-
ator. These led to the signing of seven agree-
ments: customs documents, the mutual rec-
ognition of higher-education diplomas, the 
freedom of movement of persons, the rep-
resentation of Kosovo at the regional level, land 
registries and documents on births, deaths and 
marriages in Kosovo, and integrated border 
management (IBM). The IBM agreement was of 
particular importance, as it allowed the author-
ities of Kosovo to take control over the border 
with Serbia3, as were the arrangements to al-
low representatives of Prishtina to participate 
in international forums and regional coopera-
tion organisations4. These technical talks were 
accompanied by tensions, however, and in the 
summer of 2011 riots broke out in the Serb mu-
nicipalities in the north of Kosovo, highlighting 
the frustration of the Serbian minority, which 
did not accept the government in Prishtina. 
3 The agreement gave rise to particular controversy among 
the Kosovo Serbs, because it meant the establishment of 
a border between the states, making it more difficult to 
avoid tax and customs, as well as reaping the proceeds of 
smuggling.
4 It was agreed that Kosovo* will be the only denomination to 
be used, and the footnote to be applied to the asterisk will 
read: “This designation is without prejudice to positions on 
status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion 
on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence”. Initially, Serbia 
pushed hard for the use of the full designation, but over time 
it has ceased to attach so much importance to it.
The dialogue led to the Kosovo govern-
ment gaining control over the whole of 
its territory and defining its border with 
Serbia.
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Moving the dialogue from the technical to 
the political level was possible only after the 
general and presidential elections in Serbia 
in spring 2012, which were won by the right-
wing Serbian Progress Party (SNS) and the 
Socialists from the former party of Slobodan 
Milošević. It was only this new government, 
with a strong mandate and a reputation as 
a doughty defender of Serbian interests, 
which could start negotiations to subordi-
nate the four Serb municipalities in the north 
of Kosovo to the authorities in Prishtina, and 
include the parallel Serbian institutions into 
the state of Kosovo5. The talks between the 
two Prime Ministers, Ivica Dačić and Hashim 
Thaçi, which began in October 2012 under 
the auspices of the EU’s High Representative 
Catherine Ashton, led to a historic agree-
ment in April 2013 concerning these issues.
Under the agreement, Prishtina was supposed 
to take control of the Serbian power structures 
(the police and civil defence formations) and ju-
diciary6. Serbia also agreed to the first local elec-
tions organised by the Kosovo authorities in the 
four Serb municipalities in the North Kosovo. 
These were held in November 2013 and, de-
spite the very low turnout,  produced new local 
authorities who recognised the sovereignty of 
5 The term ‘parallel institutions’ is used to describe the lo-
cal government authorities, the judiciary, the police and 
so-called civil defence, the health services, the municipal 
enterprises and educational units, financed by the govern-
ment in Belgrade and functioning under the control of the 
Serbs in Kosovo. In the municipalities in southern Kosovo, 
these institutions operate in parallel with the institutions 
subordinate to Prishtina, but there were no other such in-
stitutions in the north of Kosovo before 2013.
6 In the case of the police and civil defence, the process 
can be considered completed; significant progress has 
also been noted in the integration of the judiciary.
the authorities in Prishtina. A concession on the 
part of Kosovo was the creation of the Associ-
ation of Serbian Municipalities (Zajednica Srp-
skih Opština, ZSO) by 10 municipalities where 
the Serbs are the majority population7. The sta-
tus and competence of this institution remains 
a moot point, which has dominated the negoti-
ations and is beginning to have a decisive influ-
ence on the relations between both countries 
and their approach to the talks. 
The Association of Serbian Municipa-
lities: a bone of contention 
Serbia and Kosovo have defined the role of the 
Association of Serbian Municipalities in com-
pletely different ways. Prishtina sees it as an 
agreement between the municipalities, which 
will allow the Serbian municipalities to bet-
ter perform public tasks, without a separate 
budget or joint bodies representing the com-
munity. In this understanding, the ZSO’s powers 
should derive from the prerogatives which the 
municipalities in Kosovo have. The Serbian side, 
meanwhile, sees the ZSO as an autonomous 
body, an additional unit of the administrative 
division, with a separate budget funded by Ser-
bia, the local parliament and the executive gov-
ernment. The ZSO would enjoy much broader 
powers than the municipalities in Kosovo, and 
would have the right to represent the Serbian 
municipalities to the central authorities.
Because the EU made opening the negotia-
tions with Serbia and signing the SAA with 
Kosovo conditional on finding a compromise 
on the competence of the ZSO, the agreement 
was signed in August 20158. However, it was 
7 First agreement of principles governing the nor-
malisation of relations, 19 April 2013, http://www.
kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/first_agreement_
of_principles_governing_the_normalisation_of_rela-
tions,_april_19,_2013_brussels_en.pdf
8 Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities 
Kosovo – general principles/main elements, 25 August 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/150825_02_
association-community-of-serb-majority-municipali-
ties-in-kosovo-general-principles-main-elements_en.pdf
The status of the ZSO has become the main 
bone of contention, and has a decisive 
influence on both countries’ approach to 
the talks.
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greeted by protests from Albanians in Koso-
vo, who recognised that the ZSO in its agreed 
shape – like the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – would be a tool for Belgrade’s 
influence, and could make Kosovo a dysfunc-
tional state. Moreover, in December 2015 
some of the arrangements were contested by 
Kosovo’s constitutional court. The implemen-
tation of the agreement also requires clarifi-
cation and preparation of the executive acts. 
The creation of the ZSO has thus been delayed, 
and the dispute around the institutions cannot be 
said to have ended. The talks are now dominated 
by the issue of the ZSO, which not only blocks 
discussion on other issues, but also inhibits the 
implementation of other agreements, such as 
the integration of Kosovo’s institutions with the 
Belgrade-funded health, education and munici-
pal services. Serbia is indeed of the opinion that 
this can occur only after the ZSO has been es-
tablished. For Kosovo Albanians, the problem is 
increasingly not so much the status of the ZSO 
itself as the fact that Belgrade has fully subordi-
nated the Serb minority in Kosovo to itself. 
Serbia: playing the Kosovo card 
Paradoxically, the process of dialogue, which 
was supposed to include the Kosovo Serbs in the 
structures of Kosovar statehood, has consider-
ably strengthened the influence and control of 
Belgrade over the Serb minority. The policies of 
the EU and Prishtina have contributed to this 
by avoiding direct negotiations with the Kosovo 
Serbs (especially those in the north of Kosovo), 
assuming that Belgrade would convince this 
minority to submit to the Kosovar authorities. 
Serbia’s policy, however, has moved in the op-
posite direction, in connection with the chang-
es on the political scene in Belgrade.
One tool to control the minority in Kosovo is the 
Serbian List election platform (Srpska Lista, SL), 
which was established at Belgrade’s initiative be-
fore the municipal elections in 2013. It was in-
tended to serve as a counterbalance for the local 
leaders in the municipalities in the north of Koso-
vo, who opposed the Serbian government’s pol-
icy towards Kosovo and strongly opposed their 
inclusion into the Kosovo state. The SL politicians 
were chosen on very low turnouts, and under 
pressure from the authorities in Belgrade, but it 
allowed the local authorities to be constituted in 
accordance with the findings of April 2013. The 
SL strengthened its position as the sole repre-
sentative of the Kosovo Serbs after the general 
elections in 2014, which they won with logistic 
and financial support from Belgrade, by margin-
alising the groups who had favoured direct co-
operation with the Kosovo authorities and had 
been popular in the Serbian enclaves. The SL’s 
politicians are totally dependent on support from 
Belgrade, which has given them control over the 
funding they receive from Serbia (around €250 
million annually) and the distribution of jobs 
related to it (the Kosovo Serbs mostly work in 
the public sector or in state-owned enterprises 
financed by Belgrade). As a consequence, these 
politicians are primarily interested in implement-
ing the priorities of the Serbian government, and 
not in defending the long-term interests of the 
Serbian minority in Kosovo.
This subordination by Belgrade of the Serbi-
an community in Kosovo is associated with 
the political changes in Serbia itself. The diffi-
cult economic situation in Serbia, and a series of 
corruption scandals (which include the financ-
ing of the Serb minority in Kosovo), have trans-
lated into a drop in support among the Serbian 
public for getting financially involved in Kosovo. 
Paradoxically, the dialogue, which was 
supposed to include the Kosovo Serbs in 
the structures of Kosovar statehood, has 
considerably strengthened Belgrade’s 
control over the Serb minority.
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The dominance of the SNS and Prime Minister 
Alexander Vučić on the political scene after 
their strong victory in 2014 has led to a limiting 
of political pluralism and the marginalisation 
of the extreme right. The issue of Kosovo has 
thus become much less important as a tool for 
mobilising the electorate. The Serb minority in 
Kosovo has lost its ability to put pressure on the 
government in Belgrade by appealing directly 
to the Serbian public. Previously, the liberal and 
pro-European parties governing in Serbia had 
courted support from the leaders of the Ser-
bian minority in Kosovo, who had condemned 
some parties as ‘traitors to Serbian interests’. 
The right-wing SNS does not need any such le-
gitimacy from them. In addition, the party has 
taken control over financial aid to the minority 
and has subordinated the local leaders in Koso-
vo to itself. This allows Vučić’s government to 
treat the issue of the Kosovo Serbs as a useful 
tool for its own ends. Belgrade is interested in 
strengthening its control over the minority, and 
supports any extension of its rights in Kosovo 
which would guarantee Serbia an influence on 
the development of the situation in Kosovo, 
even though this will not necessarily translate 
into better living conditions for the Serbian mi-
nority there9.
9 Belgrade attaches little importance to implementing the 
existing agreements or entering into new ones (such as 
the recognition of diplomas or court judgements), or to 
strengthening the autonomy and efficiency of the Ser-
bian municipalities in Kosovo, which would facilitate the 
functioning of the Serbian community
Kosovo: drop in support for dialogue 
with the Serbs 
Prishtina assumed that the dialogue would make 
it easier for the state to operate internationally 
and strengthen its sovereignty, in exchange for 
some concessions to the Serbian minority. Five 
years on, the increasing concessions to Serbia 
and the Serbs have not, in the perception of 
Albanians, brought any of the expected ben-
efits. Support for the dialogue, which is seen 
as beneficial only for the Serbs, has fallen10. For 
the Kosovar Albanians, clear confirmation of 
this trend was the agreement in August 2015 
concerning the Association of Serbian Munic-
ipalities, which from their perspective was 
a far-reaching concession11. Soon afterwards, in 
the autumn of 2015, Belgrade and the Serbian 
Orthodox Church carried out a wide-ranging 
campaign that led to Kosovo’s membership in 
UNESCO being blocked. The results of the Serbi-
an-Kosovar talks have had very little impact on 
specific benefits for the inhabitants of Kosovo 
– regardless of nationality – as they are being 
implemented far too slowly12. 
The reluctance to continue the dialogue is linked 
to the identification of this process with the cor-
rupt elite, as embodied by President Hashim 
Thaçi of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 
10 Over 48% of Albanians believe that the dialogue has been 
more beneficial for Serbia, and 58% say that it has not 
affected the normalisation of relations between Kosovo 
and Serbia in any way. ‘Public Perceptions on Kosovo’s 
foreign policy and dialog with Serbia’, p. 29-30.
11 This agreement conflicts with the existing objectives 
of the construction of a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo 
based on the so-called Ahtisaari plan, which precisely 
because of the dysfunctionality of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where a model of wide territorial autonomy has been 
applied, instituted far-reaching decentralisation and the 
transfer of significant powers to municipalities. This was 
done to guarantee minorities a wide range of self-gov-
ernment, but also in order to weaken ethnic divisions 
and force cooperation. 78% of Albanians consider the 
agreement to be unfavourable to Kosovo.
12 For example, the agreement on the free movement of 
people in theory enabled people with Kosovo papers to 
travel to Serbia, but this has been hindered by numer-
ous restrictions, and is very costly as there is no mutual 
acknowledgement of insurance.
The increasing concessions to Serbia and 
the Serbs have not, in the perception of 
Albanians, brought any of the expected 
benefits.
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and Prime Minister Isa Mustafa from the Demo-
cratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The PDK and LDK, 
which currently make up the so-called grand co-
alition (which also includes representatives of the 
Serb minority) have taken turns governing Koso-
vo since 1999, and are blamed by the public for 
the lack of improvement in the socio-economic 
situation. In the opinion of a large part of pub-
lic opinion, this elite remains in power thanks to 
the support of the EU, which in return obtains 
a conciliatory position towards Serbia. Moreover, 
in the name of progress in the Serbian-Kosovar 
talks, laws are passed which do not conform to 
the basic law of Kosovo13. In this way, the EU also 
becomes the object of criticism, as by prioritising 
the dialogue between Kosovo and the Serbs, it 
allows actions to take place which hinder the con-
struction of a just and democratic rule of law14. 
This social dissatisfaction is being exploited and 
stoked by the opposition parties Vetëvendosje 
(Self-Determination), NISMA për Kosovën (Initi-
ative For Kosovo) and the Alliance for the Future 
of Kosovo (AAK), which claim that the depend-
ence on support from the West weakens the 
government’s position in its negotiations with 
Belgrade. The August 2015 agreement on the 
ZSO question led to the escalation of the dispute 
between the government and the opposition15. 
Parliament’s work was paralysed (by some dep-
uties regularly releasing tear gas in the camber), 
13 Cf. B. Weber, Awkward juggling: Constitutional insecu-
rity, political instability and the rule of law at risk in the 
Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, prishtinainsight.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/04/URBIRN-Report-2016-ENG.pdf
14 The controversy concerns the presidential elections in 
2011 and 2016, and the blocking of the assumption of 
government by the opposition in the 2014 elections by 
exploiting various legal loopholes.
15 They are also challenging the border agreement with 
Montenegro.
and reforms have been blocked (in 2015, the 
Kosovo parliament passed only 25% of the laws 
set before it). In the near future this crisis will 
worsen because the opposition, by resisting the 
Serbian-Kosovar agreements, will build up its 
position by effectively mobilising the public16. 
The Serbs:  
caught between Belgrade and Prishtina 
Most of the Kosovo Serbs, particularly in the 
north, have still not accepted the independ-
ence of Kosovo or their new status as a minor-
ity in an Albanian-dominated state which is 
much poorer and less efficient than Serbia. For 
Serbs, the biggest problem – beyond the poor 
economic situation and low living standards – 
is the uncertainty that arises from Belgrade’s 
policy, which they find incomprehensible. On 
the one hand, the Serbian authorities have 
urged the minority to integrate with the insti-
tutions of Kosovo (e.g. by voting); on the oth-
er, they stress at every step that Kosovo is part 
of Serbia. Paradoxically, the lack of compro-
mise on the ZSO question, and the same lack 
of agreement over which institutions are to be 
financed from Serbia and on what conditions, 
actually  favours the authorities in Belgrade. 
Transparent regulations would stop the Serb 
authorities from manipulating the Kosovo mi-
nority, which fears that Belgrade’s withdrawal 
of funding for the Serbian institutions would 
result in a drastic deterioration in the area’s al-
ready low standard of living. In turn, dialogue 
in the Belgrade-Prishtina-Brussels triangle has 
deprived the Serb minority of any influence 
on a solution, and has also deepened mistrust 
between the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, 
where the latter are increasingly seen as Bel-
grade’s agents acting to the detriment of the 
state as a whole. To make matters worse, nei-
ther Belgrade nor Prishtina are interested in 
building trust between the communities. 
16 A petition against the August agreement on the ZSO 
was signed by up to 200,000 people.
Most Kosovo Serbs have still not accept-
ed their new status as a minority in an 
Albanian-dominated state.
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The lack of EU ‘carrots’
The European Union has made progress in 
Kosovo and Serbia’s accession process condi-
tional on the conclusion and implementation 
of a series of agreements, using both states’ 
aspirations to join the EU to force them into 
making progress in normalising relations17. 
However, this policy is becoming less and less 
effective. The EU, which is focused on the crises 
on its borders and on internal issues, is less and 
less involved in the Serbian-Kosovar dialogue. 
What is more, the failure by five EU member 
states to recognise Kosovo’s independence hin-
ders the development of a common approach 
to the dialogue and the conditions for Serbia’s 
membership (e.g. in terms of the need to recog-
nise Kosovo’s independence before it can join). 
At the current stage of both countries’ acces-
sion process, the EU has few specific instru-
ments which could encourage them to make 
any concessions. When Serbia opened the first 
negotiating chapters in December 2015, it be-
gan a period of tedious, technical talks. Simi-
larly Kosovo, which signed the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement in October 2015, has no 
greater hope of making rapid progress in its in-
tegration with the EU. 
The normalisation of relations with Kosovo was 
included in a separate chapter in Serbia’s acces-
sion negotiations with the EU, and these may 
be suspended if the process does not continue. 
However, it is unlikely that the EU would be will-
ing to use this tool. The refugee crisis, and also 
the active policy taken by Russia in the region, 
17 European Council Conclusion, 13/14 December 2012. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/ec/134353.pdf
has significantly strengthened Serbia’s position 
in its talks with the EU. On the one hand, Bel-
grade stresses that it is a reliable partner for 
the EU on the Balkan migration route, but on 
the other it has also hinted that it could change 
its geopolitical orientation and move closer to 
Moscow if the West’s conditions are too tough. 
Prospects
For Prishtina, the lack of any solutions to re-
solve the disputes in its relations with Serbia is 
a major problem. This makes the functioning 
of the state more difficult, and inhibits its eco-
nomic development; it also blocks the state’s 
membership of the UN and other internation-
al organisations18. The question of integrating 
the Serb minority is of key importance for the 
strengthening of the state’s sovereignty. Al-
though Belgrade has ruled out recognising the 
independence of Kosovo as a matter of doc-
trine (and it is hard to expect any change in that 
regard over the next few years), its disputes 
with Kosovo have definitely become less rele-
vant from the perspective of Serbia’s stability 
and efficiency, and they already cause less con-
troversy than before on the domestic front19. 
Moreover, Serbia’s international position has 
strengthened significantly – both with respect 
to Kosovo, which is struggling with its image as 
a failed state ruled by a corrupt elite; and to the 
EU, because Belgrade has become an important 
partner in solving the refugee crisis. There has 
been a substantial change compared with 2011, 
as at that time Serbia, which was very keen on 
18 Moreover, other outstanding issues remain: the ownership 
of enterprises, such as the Ujman/Gazivoda hydroelec-
tric power plant, the Trepča mining complex, the supply 
of drinking water and the cooling plant at Obilić on Lake 
Gazivoda, which lies in a Serb municipality in the north, the 
international telephone code of Kosovo, the use of Serbian 
airspace by aircraft flying to and from Kosovo, etc.
19 It cannot be ruled out that the issue of Kosovo will be 
used for social mobilisation, if it is helpful to the political 
elite, to divert attention from internal problems and the 
bad economic situation. The issue of Kosovo is also very 
well publicised in the Russian media, which are increas-
ingly popular in Serbia.
Belgrade’s priority is to obtain as much in-
fluence on the situation inside Kosovo as 
possible.
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making visible progress in its integration with 
the EU, was in a much weaker position with 
regard to Kosovo, which was then supported 
more strongly by the United States. 
Belgrade’s priority now is to obtain maximum 
concessions from the authorities in Prishtina, 
and as much influence on the situation inside 
Kosovo as possible, including by ensuring ex-
tensive autonomy for the Serb minority, and 
wielding influence on the Kosovo government’s 
policy. The current situation is favourable  for 
Belgrade as it strengthens its position, and can 
blame Kosovo for the stalemate in the dialogue 
process. In Serbia, stronger support for the ex-
treme right-wing parties, which entered parlia-
ment in April 2016 as a result of the general 
elections, is another factor impeding compro-
mise with Prishtina. In Kosovo itself, the politi-
cal crisis and resistance to talks with Serbia will 
get worse. The authorities in Prishtina, fearing 
the loss of support from the West, cannot with-
draw from this process. They will, however, try 
to add further points to the discussions (ques-
tions of reparations, the division of property, 
etc.), and to sabotage the implementation of 
any agreements that would favour the Serbian 
side, in order to strengthen their own negoti-
ating position with regard to Belgrade. For do-
mestic purposes, measures are already being 
taken which attest to Prishtina’s uncompromis-
ing attitude (these include the decision in April 
2016 to prohibit the entry into Kosovo of the 
Serbian defence and interior ministers). This 
significantly reduces the chances of any further 
agreements being made, or of any progress in 
the discussions. 
The talks started in 2011 by Serbia and Kosovo 
under the auspices of the EU were intended to 
lead to a gradual normalisation of relations (on 
the model of the relationship between West and 
East Germany in the 1970s), without the need 
for Belgrade to officially recognise the independ-
ence of Kosovo. The current formula for the di-
alogue offers little hope of achieving this aim, 
the more so as the EU, which had hitherto been 
the main driving force behind this process, is be-
coming less active in this field. Since 2013, no 
new issues have been included in the dialogue, 
and the new agreements only relate to the im-
plementation of provisions already adopted, 
a process which is proceeding very slowly, even 
with regard to very simple issues (for example, 
the mutual recognition of diplomas). This lack 
of progress is related to concessions by the EU, 
which by subordinating relations with Serbia 
and Kosovo to the dialogue process has accept-
ed the increasing shortcomings in compliance 
with democratic standards by the governing 
elites of both countries. There is a lack of will 
on both sides to conclude agreements or resolve 
problems; in fact, they are extending their lists 
of disputes. Some of these are of no practical 
significance (such as Serbia’s non-recognition 
of ADR certificates from Kosovo20), but they put 
further political obstacles in the dialogue pro-
cess. The Serbian-Kosovar negotiations are thus 
becoming a farce, which is not helping the pro-
cess of normalisation, and is in fact exacerbating 
the antagonisms between Serbia and Kosovo, 
and between the Albanians and Serbs within 
Kosovo. Continuing these talks on the basis of 
the current standards may squander the achieve-
ments made so far, and lead to a deterioration 
of the stability of the region.
20 ADR: the international convention concerning the car-
riage of dangerous goods and loads.
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